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1 Introduction
Despite a large body of evidence showing a positive association between family income
and child development, there is much controversy about whether these correlations can be
given causal interpretations. Unobservable determinants of children's outcomes that are
correlated with family income, like parental abilities, are of major concern when assessing
the causal impact of family income on child development. While most previous studies
have used family-specic xed eects estimators to eliminate biases from permanent family
characteristics, a recent strand of the literature exploits quasi-natural experiments to
instrument for family income.1
Although these studies represent a signicant step forward, the evidence is far from
conclusive: some studies report small and sometimes insignicant eects of family income
on child outcomes, whereas other suggest substantial positive eects.2 There are several
possible explanations for the conicting conclusions reached in previous studies. On the
one hand, Duncan et al. (2009) advocate that these dierences might be because studies
rely on dierent data sources, gathered in dierent countries at dierent times. On the
other hand, Dahl and Lochner (2008) argue that the discrepancy in the results may be
because FE estimators do not control for endogenous transitory shocks (e.g. parental
job loss or promotion, family illness, residential moves) and likely suer from greater
attenuation bias (because measurement error is greater for family income measured in
dierences than in levels).
In this paper, we take a dierent perspective, exploring whether the use of linear xed
eect (FE) and instrumental variables (IV) estimators, as in previous studies, can lie
behind the diverging results. The reliance on linear FE and IV estimators, in which child
outcome is specied as a linear function of family income, is worrisome for two reasons.
The rst reason is that economic theory, as well as a large body of descriptive evidence,
1See surveys by Mayer (1997), Solon (1999) and Almond and Currie (2010)
2While the IV estimates reported in Oreopoulos et al. (2005), Dahl and Lochner (2008) and Milligan
and Stabile (2007) suggest some positive eects of family income on children's (short-run) outcomes, Shea
(2000) and Lken (2010) nd little, if any, impact of family income. Using FE estimation, both Duncan
et al. (1998) and Levy and Duncan (2000) nd that family income is important for children's educational
attainment, whereas Blau (1999) and Dooley and Stewart (2004) nd a small eect of family income on
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suggests a nonlinear relationship. In particular, the seminal model of Becker and Tomes
(1979, 1986) indicates an increasing concave relationship. This is because parents with
low family income are more likely to be credit constrained and will therefore under-invest
in their children's human capital.3 The marginal return on human capital will therefore
exceed that on assets in credit constrained families. This implies that poor parents will
invest more of an increase in family income in children's human capital compared to
rich parents who would give more as bequests. The theoretical prediction of a concave
relationship is supported by the OLS estimates reported in Blau (1999) and Duncan et
al. (2009), suggesting a much stronger association between childhood family income and
child development in poor families than in rich families, both in the US and in Norway.
The second reason is that econometric theory tells us that the linear FE and IV
estimators will, in general, capture marginal eects at dierent parts of the family income
distribution.4 This implies that a linear FE estimate is expected to dier from a linear
IV estimate when the marginal eects are non-constant, even if there is no measurement
error or omitted variables bias. To x ideas, suppose that the causal relationship between
family income and child outcomes is approximately concave. In such a case, a study
using an instrument that aects family income in the upper part of the family income
distribution would produce a lower linear IV estimate than a study using an instrument
shifting the family income of poor families. A linear FE estimate, on the other hand, would
be relatively large in a situation where income shocks largely pertain to poor families (e.g.
due to parental job loss or a welfare reform), compared to the case where rich families
experience most of the time variation in income (e.g. due to uctuations in dividends and
capital income).
3As emphasized by Heckman (2008), there are two distinct types of credit constraints operating on
the family and its children, which can produce a nonlinear relationship between family income and child
outcome. The rst constraint is the inability of parents to borrow against their children's future income
to nance investment in them. The second constraint is the inability of parents to borrow against their
own income to nance investment in their children. See also Heckman (2008) for a discussion of evidence
suggesting that credit constraints operating in childhood actually aect children's ability and educational
outcome as adults.
4See Angrist and Imbens (1995) and Angrist and Krueger (1999) for a discussion of how the linear
IV and OLS estimators can be decomposed into weighted averages of specic marginal eects, where
the IV and OLS weights generally dier, and Mogstad and Wiswall (2010) for an assessment of how the
dierences in weighting matters for causal inference from linear models.What Linear Estimators Miss 3
A concern is therefore that the linear FE and IV estimates might present an incomplete
and even misleading picture of the causal relationship between family income and child
outcomes. For example, they may be far from the population average treatment eect,
or some other policy-relevant treatment eect.5. Moreover, the linearity restriction may
prevent us from reaching a consensus about the causal link between family income and
child outcomes. To examine these issues, we start out by following the previous literature
in applying linear FE and IV estimators to draw causal inference about the eect of family
income on child outcomes. Then we depart from previous studies in two ways. First, to
determine what linear FE and IV estimators actually identify, we estimate how they
weight the marginal eects at dierent parts of the family income distribution. Second,
to allow the marginal eects of an increase in family income to vary across the family
income distribution, we relax the linearity restriction in the FE and IV estimation.
We use the same data as Lken (2010), administrative registers for the entire popula-
tion of Norway, with information on children's educational attainment and IQ as adults
as well as their family income during childhood. In addition, we follow Lken (2010)
in exploiting regional and time variation in the economic boom that followed the initial
discovery of oil in Norway, as the instrument for family income. In doing so, we are
able to control for unobserved permanent dierences between children born in dierent
years as well as between children born in dierent areas. An advantage of our data set
is that it allows us to perform both IV and FE estimation. We can therefore rule out
country dierences as a source of disparities. In addition, by using administrative data
rather then self-reported surveys, we reduce the problem of measurement error in family
income. Consequently, dierent levels of attenuation bias become a less likely source of
discrepancy between the FE and IV estimates.
As in the previous literature, our linear OLS estimates indicate a positive and sizable
eect of family income on children's IQ and educational attainment as adults. However,
when estimating a non-parametric model in family income, we nd a concave relationship
with large marginal eects at the lower part of the family income distribution. Figure
5See Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) for a discussion of policy-relevant treatment eects.What Linear Estimators Miss 4
1 provides a sense of how poor the linear approximation is to the empirical relationship.
This gure plots the marginal eects from a linear, quadratic and cubic model across
the income distribution. The concave pattern between family income and children's ed-
ucation, evident in both the quadratic and cubic OLS results, raises doubts about the
appropriateness of the linearity restriction in IV and FE estimation.
Our linear FE and IV results show estimates of family income on children's IQ and
educational attainment that are insignicant and typically close to zero. In the spirit of
previous studies, our results could be interpreted as suggesting little, if any, causal eect
of family income on children's outcomes, once omitted variables bias is addressed by IV
or FE techniques. However, unless the causal relationship between family income and
child outcome is approximately linear, this conclusion rests on the weights attached to
the marginal eects being similar across the estimators.
To compute these weights, we draw on previous work showing how the linear OLS
and IV estimator can be decomposed into weighted averages of the marginal eects (An-
grist and Imbens, 1995; Angrist and Krueger, 1999). To our knowledge, however, such
a decomposition does not exist for the linear FE estimator. We therefore develop a de-
composition of the linear FE estimator, which shows how it weights the marginal eects
according to which family income levels the within-family income variation occurs. This
decomposition allows us to directly compare the linear FE weighting to that of the linear
OLS and IV estimators. We also provide a numerical algorithm that straightforwardly
calculates the FE weights for any data set. We further demonstrate that both linear IV
and FE estimators may assign negative weights to some marginal eects. The possibility
of negative weights underscores that we need to be cautious about employing these linear
estimators in situations where the underlying relationship is likely to be nonlinear. For
example, with negative weights the linear IV and FE estimators are no longer restricted
to lie between the maximum and minimum marginal eects. Further, they might produce
a negative (positive), or zero estimate, even if all the marginal eects are strictly positive
(negative).
When computing the weights, it is reassuring to nd that both the linear IV andWhat Linear Estimators Miss 5
FE estimators assign non-negative weight to every marginal eect in our particular ap-
plication. However, the distribution of weights is quite dierent across the estimators.
Specically, the linear IV estimator assigns little weight to the marginal eects at the
lower part of the income distribution, illustrating that the oil boom did not do much for
family income of poor families. We also nd that poor families in Norway experienced
little within-family income variation, implying that marginal eects in the middle and
upper part of the income distribution are weighted heavily in the linear FE estimator.
The fact that our IV and FE estimators assign very little weight to the marginal eects
at the lower part of the income distribution could explain why they suggest small, if any,
eect of family income on child outcome. In comparison, the sizable linear OLS estimate
assign much more weight to marginal eects in the lower part of the income distribution.
To directly test whether the linearity restriction drive the conclusions drawn about the
causal relationship between family income and child outcome, we specify child outcome
as a quadratic function of family income. In doing so, we can examine how the estimated
family income eects change when allowing the marginal eects to vary across the family
income distribution. We then nd that the IV and FE estimates suggest a concave causal
relationship, with marginal eects at the lower part of the family income distribution
that are several orders of magnitude larger than the marginal eects at the middle and
upper part of the family income distribution. Our quadratic specication is intended to
achieve a reasonable tradeo between exibility in functional form and achieving sucient
precision. We admittedly cannot rule out that an even more exible specication would
provide a better approximation of the causal relationship between family income and child
outcome. At the very least, our quadratic model nests the linear model, and is therefore
an improvement over the linear specication in family income used in the FE and IV
estimation in previous studies.
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses what linear OLS, IV and FE estima-
tors identify. Section 3 describes our data and discusses the natural experiment used as
an instrument for family income. Section 4 presents the empirical results, before Section
5 summarizes and concludes with a discussion of policy implications.What Linear Estimators Miss 6
2 What Linear Estimators Identify
In this section, we discuss the implications of nonlinearities for the interpretation and
comparison of linear OLS, IV, and FE estimators. For simplicity, this section ignores
control variables, but we will include them in the empirical analysis.
2.1 Potential outcomes, linearity, and marginal eects
Let fi(c) denote the potential (or latent) outcome that child i would receive with level
c of childhood family income. In the context of a theoretical model of the relationship
between family income and child outcome, the functional form of fi(c) may be determined
by aspects of individual behavior and/or market forces, like in Becker and Tomes (1979,
1986). With or without an explicit theoretical model for fi(c), however, we can think of
this function as describing the outcome level that child i would achieve if he or she was
assigned childhood family income c (e.g. in an experiment).
The observed level of family income for child i is denoted by Ci. The standard re-
gression framework used in the literature to link the potential outcome to the observed
outcome, yi, has the following form
yi = fi(Ci) =  + Ci + i: (1)
This model forms the basis for previous studies using OLS, IV, and FE techniques to
examine the impact of family income on child outcomes. In addition to assuming con-
stant marginal eects of additional family income, it says that the functional relationship
of interest is the same for all individuals. The only individual-specic component is the
mean-zero error component i, which captures unobserved factors determining child out-
come.
Our point of departure is to relax the linearity assumption and allow the marginal
eects on children's outcomes of an increase in family income to vary across the family
income distribution, as theory suggests. Let family income take on values in the nite set
Ci 2 f0;1;:::; cg. Using dummy variables constructed as dci = 1fCi  cg, we can specifyWhat Linear Estimators Miss 7
a non-parametric model in family income
yi =  +
 c X
c=1
cdci + i: (2)
The c coecient then represents the marginal eect of a one unit (e.g. USD 1) increase
from family income level c   1 to c. There are  c distinct marginal eects: 1;:::; c. In
contrast, the standard linear model (1) assumes that the marginal eects are the same
for all family income margins: c =  for all c > 0.6
2.2 OLS decomposition
The OLS estimand for  in (1) is (OLS) = Cov(yi;Ci)=V ar(Ci). Angrist and Krueger
(1999), drawing on results from Yitzhaki (1996), show that the linear OLS estimand can





where the OLS estimand of c is given by
c(OLS) = E[yijCi = c]   E[yijCi = c   1];






qc = (E[CijCi  c]   E[CijCi < c])(pr(dci = 1)(1   pr(dci = 1)):
The OLS weights are non-zero, sum to 1, and can be directly estimated using the sample
6It should be noted that both (1) and (2) restrict the functional form to be the same for all children.
We do so to focus attention on the issue of non-constant marginal eects. As discussed below, even if
there is heterogeneity in the marginal eects, c is still interpretable as the average marginal eect of
increasing family income from c   1 to c, such that E[ci] = c.What Linear Estimators Miss 8
analog of the above expressions.
There are two issues with OLS estimation. First, as emphasized in the previous
literature, OLS estimates will be biased if observed family income Ci is correlated with
the unobserved components of the child outcome, i. Using (2), we can re-write the OLS
estimand of the marginal eect as
c(OLS) = c + 4c;
where 4c = E[ijCi = c]   E[ijCi = c   1] represents the omitted variables bias in
c(OLS).
The second issue, which has received less attention in previous studies, is that the
linear OLS estimand has a particular weighting over the marginal eects given by (3).
Specically, weight is given to each c in proportion to the conditional mean of Ci, above
and below c. More weight is also given to marginal eects close to the sample median of
Ci, since this is where pr(dci = 1)(1 pr(dci = 1) is maximized. If there are nonlinearities
in the OLS estimates of the marginal eects (c(OLS) 6= c0(OLS) for c 6= c0), then it
follows from (3) that the linear OLS estimate depends on how it weights the marginal
eects, and thereby the sample distribution of family income. Depending on the weights,
the linear OLS estimate will range between the maximum and minimum c(OLS).
2.3 IV decomposition
Angrist and Imbens (1995) provide an analogous decomposition of the linear IV estimand
in the case of binary instrument and under an assumption of monotonicity. As our em-
pirical analysis uses a multi-valued instrument, we generalize their decomposition result,
and moreover, discuss how the linear IV estimator may assign negative weights to some
marginal eects if monotonicity does not hold.
Consider the case of a scalar (binary or multi-valued) instrument zi. Suppose that the
standard IV assumptions hold:
Assumption A1 (Instrument Uncorrelated with Residual): Cov(i;zi) = 0.What Linear Estimators Miss 9
Assumption A2 (Instrument Correlated with Family Income): Cov(Ci;zi) 6= 0.
These assumptions imply that the instrument is uncorrelated with the unobserved factors
determining child outcomes, and that the instrument has some eect on family income.
Under Assumptions A1 and A2, the IV estimand for  in (1) is (z) = Cov(yi;zi)=Cov(Ci;zi).
To decompose (z) into a weighted average of the marginal eects c, substitute for yi in
(2), which yields
Cov(yi;zi) = Cov(( + 1d1i +  +  cd ci + i);zi)
= 1Cov(d1i;zi) +  +  cCov(d c;i;zi) + Cov(i;zi):










These weights sum to one, and can be computed using the sample analog of the expression
above.7
From (4), we learn that (z) is a weighted average of the marginal eects across the
family income distribution. The weight wc(z) attached to c depends on the proportion
of children who, because of the instrument, experience a change in family income from
less than c to c or more. Hence, (z) assigns more weight to the marginal eects for the
levels of family income that are most aected by the particular instrument chosen.
One important feature of the linear IV estimand is that the weights wc(z) are functions
of the chosen instrument zi, implying that other instruments can lead to dierent weights
and dierent (z). If there are nonlinearities in the marginal eects (c(z) 6= c0(z)
7To see that the wc(z) weights sum to 1, note that Ci =
P c
c=1 dci, so that Cov(Ci;zi) = P c
c=1 Cov(dci;zi).What Linear Estimators Miss 10
for c 6= c0), linear IV estimators based on dierent instruments will generally produce
disparate estimates of the eect of family income. Hence, previous studies may have
reached conicting conclusions about the eect of family income on child outcome, because
their linear IV estimates capture marginal eects at dierent parts of the family income
distribution. For example, the fact that Dahl and Lochner (2008) report substantial
positive eects of family income, whereas Lken (2010) nds little if any eect, may
simply be because of nonlinearities: While the Earned Income Tax Credit welfare reform
instrument used in the former study primarily changed the family income of relatively
poor families, the oil boom instrument used in the latter study had the largest impact on
the middle and upper part of the family income distribution.
From (4), it is clear that some (but not all) wc(z) might be negative. Negative weights
occur in situations where the the instrument increases family income at some family
income margins, but decreases it at other margins, so that Cov(dci;zi) varies in sign
depending on c. This might occur, for example, if the instrument is based on some
re-distributive policy change in which poor families receive additional family income,
whereas rich families experience a reduction in income due to higher taxes. The possibility
of negative weights has some troubling implications. First of all, (z) is not necessarily
restricted to lie between the maximum and minimum c, when the IV weights are negative.
As a consequence, (z) may not be representative of any particular marginal eect or
subset of marginal eects. An additional implication of negative IV weights is that the
linear IV estimator can be negative (positive) even if all the marginal eects are strictly
positive (negative).
To ensure non-negative weights, one may follow Angrist and Imbens (1995) in assum-
ing monotonicity, which means that the instrument aects everyone in the same way, if
at all. Under this assumption, Cov(dci;zi) has the same sign for all c. With monotonic-
ity and a binary instrument, it follows straightforwardly that (4) coincides with the IV
decomposition proposed by Angrist and Imbens (1995).8
8If z is binary then the IV weights in (4) can be expressed as
wc(z) =
pr(dci = 1jzi = 1)   pr(dci = 1)
P c
s=1 pr(dsi = 1jzi = 1)   pr(dsi = 1)
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2.4 FE decomposition
We next move to developing a novel decomposition of the linear FE estimator. This
decomposition allows us to understand how the FE estimator weights the various marginal
eects and directly compare the linear FE weighting to that of the linear OLS and IV
estimators.
As the FE estimator requires information on outcomes and family income for pairs of
siblings, we need to extend the cross-sectional setup used in the discussion of the OLS
and IV estimators to a panel data setting. Let Cbj denote observed childhood family
income of sibling b from family j, which as above is assumed to take on values in the
nite set Cbj 2 f0;1;:::; cg. Let fbj(c) represent the potential outcome that child b from
family j would receive with level c in childhood family income. For simplicity, we focus
our attention on the two sibling FE estimator, so that b 2 f1;2g.
The motivation for FE estimation is the concern that OLS estimates could be biased
because of some xed unobserved family characteristic correlated with family income and
child outcomes, e.g. inheritable parental characteristics. Suppose that siblings share a
common family-specic xed eect, j, which is potentially heterogeneous in the popula-
tion and possibly correlated with the level of family income. The potential outcome for
sibling b 2 f1;2g from family j can then be linked to the observed outcome, fbj(Cbj), in
the following way:
ybj = fbj(Cbj) = bj +
 c X
c=1
cdcbj + bj; (5)
where dcbj = 1fCbj  cg and bj = j + b, where j is the family-specic xed eect
and b is a sibling-specic b 2 f1;2g intercept. Without loss of generality, we normalize
1 = 0, implying that 1j = j and 2j = j + 2. Restricting the siblings to have the
same intercept is of course a special case of (5) where 2 = 0.9
The linear FE model restricts the marginal eects of additional income to be constant
since Cov(dci;zi) = pr(zi = 1)[pr(dci = 1jzi = 1)   pr(dci = 1)].
9In a two period panel model, the 2 term allows for a time-specic xed eect. For example, if
siblings were ordered by sequence of birth in the rst dierence transformation, 2 would be a birth
order xed eect.What Linear Estimators Miss 12
across the family income distribution, c =  for all c, and is given by
ybj = bj + Cbj + bj: (6)
As is well known, the family-specic xed eects can be eliminated by taking a dierence
transformation of (6) between all pairs of siblings, which yields the rst-dierences model:
yj = 2 + Cj + j; (7)
where yj = y2j   y1j, Cj = C2j   C1j, and j = 2j   1j are the sibling dierence in
outcome, family income during childhood, and the residual.10 For notational purposes,
and without loss of generality, we sort siblings by their family income before taking the
dierence transformation, so that Cj  0 for all j. This implies that Cj 2 f0;1;:::; cg,
so that both family income levels and family income changes take on the same possible
values.11
The linear FE estimand for  in (6) is (FE) = Cov(yj;Cj)=V ar(Cj), and can
be obtained by performing OLS on (7). In line with the previous literature, we consider
the following FE assumptions:
A3 (Mean-Independence of Family Income Variation): E[jjCj] = 0.
A4 (Existence of Family Income Variation): V ar(Cj) 6= 0.
Assumption A3 implies that the dierences between siblings in unobservables are uncor-
related with the dierences in family income during their childhood. Assumption A4 is
satised if there is some variation between siblings in their childhood family income. Un-
der these assumptions, the sample analogue of (FE) provides a consistent estimate of
.
10An alternative way to eliminate the family-specic xed eects is to mean-dierence, yielding the
numerically equivalent \within" estimator.
11In our empirical analysis, we include birth order xed eects to control for any dierences in outcomes
due to birth order. We have also made sure that all our FE estimates as well as the FE weights are
invariant with respect to whether we sort the siblings by birth order or family income level.What Linear Estimators Miss 13
Following the OLS decomposition dened by (3), the linear FE estimand can straight-





where the marginal eect of increasing the change in family income by one unit from s 1
to s is given by
s = E[yjjCj = s]   E[yjjCj = s   1];






s = (E[CjjCj  s]   E[CjjCj < s])(pr(Cj  s)(1   pr(Cj  s)):
As with the OLS weights, the weights  s are non-zero and sum to 1. The  s weights
reect the distribution of within-family income variation, rather than the distribution of
family income levels.
A major drawback with the decomposition (8) is that it does not reveal how the
linear FE estimator weights the marginal eects increases in family income levels, since
s is a weighted average of the various marginal eects 1;:::; c. There is therefore no
one-to-one correspondence between s and any particular marginal eect c. The reason
is that a given change in family income can occur at dierent family income levels. In
Theorem 1, we therefore provide a decomposition of the linear FE estimator (FE) into
a weighted average of the family income marginal eects c, where the weights depend
on which family income levels the within-family income variation occurs. Unlike (8), this
decomposition allows us to directly compare the linear FE weighting to that of the linear
OLS and IV estimators.What Linear Estimators Miss 14
A simplied example with three values of family income helps to understand the more
general result presented in Theorem 1. Suppose that Cbj, and thereby Cj, takes the
values 0, 1, or 2. For every pair of siblings, there are 6 possible combinations of childhood
family income, which under Assumption A3 generate the following expected dierences
in siblings' outcomes:
C1j = 0;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 0] = 2
C1j = 0;Cj = 1 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 1] = 2 + 1
C1j = 0;Cj = 2 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 2] = 2 + 1 + 2
C1j = 1;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 1;Cj = 0] = 2
C1j = 1;Cj = 1 : E[yjjC1j = 1;Cj = 1] = 2 + 2
C1j = 2;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 2;Cj = 0] = 2
From (8), it follows that
(FE) =  11 +  22
where  s and s are dened as above. Let pc(s) = pr(C1j = cjCj = s). By iterating
expectations over family income levels C1j in s , we obtain
1 = p0(1)1 + p1(1)2;
and
2 = (1 + 2)   (p0(1)1 + p1(1)2)
= (1   p0(1))1 + (1   p1(1))2;
These expressions show that 1 and 2 are weighted averages of the marginal eects of
interest 1 and 2. For brevity, we use the compact notation hsc to denote the conditional
probabilities associated with a particular c at a given s. In our simplied example, this
implies that h11 = p0(1), h12 = p1(1), h21 = (1   p0(1)), h22 = (1   p1(1)). Note thatWhat Linear Estimators Miss 15
P2
c=1 hsc = 1 for s = 1;2. By inserting these expressions for 1 and 2 in (FE), we get
that
(FE) =  1fh111 + h122g +  2fh211 + h222g
= w1(FE)1 + w2(FE)2;
where
w1(FE) =  1h11 +  2h21;
and
w2(FE) =  1h12 +  2h22:
Note that w1(FE) and w2(FE) sum to one, and (FE) is therefore a weighted average
of the marginal eects 1 and 2. Each weight consists of two types of components.
The component  s reects the proportion of children with change in family income s.
The component pc(s) represents the proportion of children with level c of family income,
given that they had a within-family income change of size s. Together, these components
determine the weights the linear FE estimator assigns to the various marginal eects of
increases in family income levels.
Theorem 1 states the general FE decomposition for any nite number of family income
levels.












c=1 wc(FE) = 1.
Proof See Appendix.
This decomposition is quite general and can be applied to any two-period panel data
setting which satises Assumptions A3 and A4. The Appendix provides a numerical
algorithm from which the linear FE weights wc(FE) can be estimated from the joint
distribution of family income levels and family income changes. Marginal eects for
family income levels that experience most of the within-family income variation receive
the most weight in the linear FE estimand. If there are nonlinearities (c 6= c for c 6= c0),
then it follows that (FE) depends on how the marginal eects are weighted, and thereby
the sample distribution of within-family income variation.
One implication of the dependence of (FE) on the sample distribution of within-
family income variation, is that the linear FE estimate can vary from sample to sample,
even if the marginal eects are the same. Consequently, caution is called for when com-
paring linear FE results across studies. For example, if the relationship between family
income and child outcome is approximately concave, a linear FE estimate will be declining
with the share of within-family income variation that is experienced by rich families.
In the above example with three values of family income, (FE) always assigns non-
negative weights to each marginal eect of increases in family income levels. However, as
stated in Proposition 1, this does not hold true in the more general case, in which wc(FE)
can be negative for some c. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, negative weights will
occur in situations where the proportion of the population that experience a particular
within-family income variation is suciently large, and moreover, where this variation is
concentrated around certain family income levels.
Proposition 1 If  c > 2, then (FE) may have wc(FE) < 0 for some (but not all) c.
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The possibility of negative weights on marginal eects underscores that we need to be
cautious in employing a linear FE estimator in situations where the underlying relationship
is likely to be nonlinear. As stated in Corollary 1, (FE) is not necessarily restricted to
lie between the maximum and minimum c, when family income takes on more than three
values. As a consequence, (FE) may not necessarily be representative of any particular
marginal eect or subset of marginal eects.
Corollary 1 If  c > 2, then (FE) may be strictly larger than the maximum c or strictly
lower than the minimum c.
Proof Follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1
A second implication, stated in Corollary 2, is that the linear FE estimator can be negative
(positive) or zero even if all the marginal eects are strictly positive (negative), when
family income takes on more than than 3 values. This means that it is possible that
family income can have a strictly positive eect on children's outcome at all family income
margins (c > 0 for all c), but the linear FE estimator is negative ((FE) < 0).
Corollary 2 If  c > 2, then it is possible that (FE)  0 even if c > 0 for all c = 1;:::; c,
or (FE)  0 even if c < 0 for all c = 1;:::; c.
Proof Follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1
2.5 Comparison of Linear Estimators
As is evident from the above decompositions, the linear OLS, IV and FE estimators in
general assign dierent weights to the underlying marginal eects. Hence, we need to
be cautious when comparing the results from these linear estimators, which may dier
simply due to the dierences in weighting.
Following Hausman (1978), a standard test of selection bias is to compare the linear
OLS and IV estimates. The idea is that if family income is exogenous, the OLS and
IV estimates would dier only by sampling error. From (1) and (4), we can express the
dierences between the linear OLS and IV estimand asWhat Linear Estimators Miss 18
(OLS)   (z) =
 c X
c=1
(wc(OLS)   wc(z))c + wc(OLS)4c;
which illustrates that the linear OLS estimate will, in general, dier from the linear IV
estimate even there is no omitted variables bias (4c = 0 for all c). For example, some of
the IV weights wc(z) on the marginal eects can be zero if the chosen instrument zi does
not shift family income at this margin. In comparison, the linear OLS estimand places
positive weight on every marginal eect in the empirical support of the sample.
By the same token, we need to be cautious in drawing inference about the validity of
a linear FE estimate by comparing it to a linear IV estimate, as they will generally dier
even if there is no omitted variables bias because of dierent weighting. To see this, note
that the dierence between the linear FE and IV estimand can be expressed as




For example, suppose that the relationship between family income and child outcome
is approximately concave. In such a case, a linear IV estimator using an instrument
aecting family income in the lower part of the family income distribution would produce
a relatively large estimate, compared to what a linear FE estimator would produce if most
of the within-family income variation occurs among high income families.
3 Data and background
This section describes our data and discusses the natural experiment used as an instrument
for family income, before displaying descriptive statistics.
3.1 Data and sample selection
As in Lken (2010), our empirical analysis utilizes several registry databases provided
by Statistics Norway. The data include a rich longitudinal dataset containing records
for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2006. The variables captured in this dataset includeWhat Linear Estimators Miss 19
individual demographic information (sex, birth year, marital status, number of children,
etc.), and socio-economic data (years of education, income, etc). Importantly, the dataset
includes personal identiers for one's parents, allowing us to link children to their par-
ents and siblings, as well as family identiers, allowing us to link spouses. Moreover, the
dataset includes geographic identiers for county of birth. The family and demographic
les are merged through the personal identiers with detailed information on children's
educational attainment as adults, reported by Norwegian educational establishments, as
well as data for males on their IQ test scores, collected from the Norwegian military
records. In Norway, military service is compulsory for every able young man. In a robust-
ness check, we will also exploit the fact that the military records also have information
on adult height (reported in centimeters).
In the empirical analysis, we use two analytical samples. In both samples, we exclude
children with missing parental identiers. As explained below, in the IV estimation we
select children born in the treatment and control counties in the years 1965, 1967, 1968
and 1969. Unlike Lken (2010), we also perform FE estimation on a sample of sibling
pairs. To get sucient precision in the FE estimates, our FE sample comprises sibling
pairs born in 1965 and between 1967 and 1977, in the treatment and control counties.
This serves two purposes. First, by increasing the sample size we get an adequate number
of siblings. Second, by having siblings further spaced apart we obtain more within-family
income variation. To provide direct comparison of the OLS vs. IV results as well as the
OLS vs. FE results, we perform OLS estimation in both the IV and FE sample.
Throughout the paper, we use three dierent measures for children's outcomes: years
of education, whether the individual is a high-school drop out, and an IQ test score.
Years of education is dened as the number of completed years of education in 2006,
whereas high-school drop out is dened as not obtaining a three year high school diploma
by 2006. In 2006, the children in our sample are at least 29 years old, which ensures
that almost all have completed their education. Unlike these two outcome measures,
the IQ test score is only available for males because they are collected from military
records, and military service is compulsory for men only. Before entering the military,What Linear Estimators Miss 20
their medical and psychological suitability is assessed; this occurs for the great majority
between their eighteenth and twentieth birthday. The IQ test score at these ages is
particularly interesting as it is about the time of entry to the labor market or to higher
education. The IQ test score is a composite score from three timed tests - arithmetic,
word similarities, and gures (see Thrane, 1997, Sundet et al. 2004, 2005). The composite
IQ test score is an un-weighted mean of the three sub-tests. The IQ score is reported in
stanine (Standard Nine) units, a method of standardizing raw scores into a nine point
standard scale that has a discrete approximation to a normal distribution, a mean of 5,
and a standard deviation of 2. We have IQ scores on about 84 percent of all Norwegian
men born in the years we consider.12
We follow Lken (2010) in our denition of family income. Income is taken from tax
registers, and includes all market income, from wages and self-employment, as well as
(taxable) cash benets such as unemployment benets, disability benets, and sickness
pay. We deated the income to real 1999 income, by using the average yearly consumer
price index. In every year, we add the income of the child's mother to her spouse's income
(if she is married), to create one variable reecting annual family income. This means
that we measure family income as the total income of the family that the child lived in,
regardless of whether the spouse of the mother is the child's biological father. We then
dene family income during childhood as the average annual family income from age 1
until age 11.
3.2 Natural experiment
We follow Lken (2010) in exploiting time and regional variation in the economic boom
that followed the initial (oshore) discovery of oil in Norway as a source to exogenous
variation in childhood family income.13 Our motivation for using the initial discovery of
12Eide et al (2005) examine patterns of missing IQ data for the men in the 1967-1987 cohorts. Of
those, 1.2 percent died within 1 year and 0.9 percent died between 1 year of age and registering with
the military at about age 18. About 1 percent men had emigrated before age 18, and 1.4 percent were
exempted because they were permanently disabled. An additional 6.2 percent of scores are missing for a
variety of reasons, most notably foreign citizenship.
13See Lken (2010) for a detailed discussion of the oil boom, and a number of results supporting the
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oil as a natural experiment is twofold. First, the extent to which childhood family income
of children born in a given year are aected by the subsequent oil boom depends on the
geographical proximity of their place of birth to the oshore oil elds. And second, for
children born in the same place, the eect of the oil boom on childhood family income
depended on their year of birth. In particular, our rst stage of the 2SLS will be a
dierence-in-dierences specication, exploiting that the oil boom most strongly aected
the childhood family income of children born in the years right before the discovery of
oil, in the county located just o the coast of the oshore oil elds.
At the end of 1969, the rst major oil discovery was made in the North Sea in Norway,
and in June 1970, the public was informed of it. Eventually, the discovery of oil fueled
the entire Norwegian economy, but Rogaland county was the rst and most strongly
inuenced because the main oil production in the relevant period was located o the
coast there.14 The large increase in labor demand from the oil industry gradually spilled
over into higher wages also for other types of jobs.
To avoid threats to the validity of the instrument from endogenous migration, the
sample used in the IV estimation consists of the cohorts born just prior to the initial
discovery of oil in Norway. The treatment group consists of the subsample of children
born in Rogaland county, whose families were exposed to the oil boom to a greater extent
than families elsewhere in Norway, because of Rogaland's geographical proximity to the
oshore oil elds. As these children grew up, this led to a rise in family income in Rogaland
compared to other counties of Norway. The control group comprises children born in ten
other counties that are geographically distant from the oshore oil elds, but with similar
family and child characteristics as those in Rogaland.15 In general, there are long driving
distances between the populated areas of the counties of Norway, as they are mostly far
14When oil was discovered, Norwegian authorities decided to make Stavanger, the largest city in Roga-
land, the country's principle oil base. The Norwegian national oil company, Statoil, and the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate were located there in 1972. Soon, other oil companies followed. While less edu-
cated individuals were hired to do basic work in the oil production in the North Sea, people with college
education, often engineers, worked in oil companies located in and around Stavanger.
15These counties are Sr-Trndelag, Hedmark, Vestfold, Aust-Agder, Oppland, Telemark, Sogn og
Fjordande, Mre og Romsdal, Nord-Trndelag, and Buskerud. The eight excluded counties are: (i)
Oslo and Akershus, comprising the capital and the surrounding urban area, (ii) Finmark, Troms, and
Nordland, the three northernmost counties, and (iii) Aust-Agder and Hordaland, the close neighboring
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apart or partitioned by mountains and/or the fjord-gashed shoreline.
As discussed in Lken (2010), before Norway discovered oil, Rogaland was a typical
Norwegian county whose main economic activities revolved around sh and agriculture.
This is mirrored in the descriptive statistics reported Table 2, showing that children in
Rogaland had very similar individual and parental characteristics as those from the control
counties. It also should be noted that the oil boom had little, if any, impact on local public
spending on schooling in Rogaland compared to other Norwegian counties. This is in part
because of the unitary school system in Norway,16 but also due to the fact that public oil
revenues went directly to the central government and were re-distributed to the counties
independently of proximity to the oshore oil elds. Hence, the instrument will pick up
variation in family income due to higher labor demand in the aected county, rather than
greater public goods expenditures in this area. When the children in our sample were old
enough to start their higher education,17 the oil boom was already incorporated in the
economy, so that there were no (observable) dierences between Rogaland and the rest of
Norway in returns to education.
Even if children from the treatment group have very similar observable characteristics
as children from the control group, we cannot rule out that they have dierent unobserved
family and child characteristics, and therefore would have dierent educational attainment
and test scores in the absence of the discovery of oil. To address this concern, we not
only include children from the treatment and control group born in the years immediately
before the reform, 1967-1969, but also children born a couple of years earlier, in 1965.
Our instrument is dened as belonging to the treatment group interacted with being
born in the years 1967-1969. The rst stage is then a dierence-in-dierences estimate
of the eect on family income of being born in Rogaland instead of one of the control
counties for the 1967-1969 cohorts compared to the 1965 cohort. Our rst and second
stage specications therefore include xed eects for birth cohort and county of birth,
16In this unied school system, the curriculum was federally determined to ensure that the educational
standards are met nationwide, and there was no room for dierent types of schools existing in parallel,
with the result that there were virtually no private schools. Moreover, expenditure per student across
municipalities were very similar.
17The rst cohort in the IV sample, born in 1965, would normally start higher education after nishing
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controlling for unobserved permanent dierences between children born in dierent years
as well as between children born in dierent areas. Our estimates are very similar when
excluding children born in 1965, like Lken (2010) does, in which case we cannot control
for unobserved dierences between children born in dierent areas.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the FE and IV samples. As displayed in Panel I,
the IV sample consists of more than 120,000 children. The samples are balanced in terms
of gender, and the number of siblings are on average 2.1. As expected, more fathers than
mothers have attended college, and fathers are on average a few years older than mothers.
For our outcome variables, we see that average education in the sample is 12.4 years and
about 30 percent of the sample have not obtained a high school diploma. The average
IQ test score of boys are 5 out of a scale from 1-9 (5 is the normed mean of this scale).
Finally, we see that average childhood family income is around NOK 252 000 (USD 43
450).
As shown in Table 1, the FE sample consists of more than 202,000 children. We see
that the IV and FE sample are quite similar in terms of observable characteristics. As we
have added younger cohorts to the sample, the children in the FE sample are on average
younger than those in the IV sample. We also see that they have slightly fewer siblings,
which is attributable to the declining fertility trend over time. Parents are younger at
the time of birth and have slightly more completed education. We also see that children
in the FE sample are performing better in terms of the outcome measures, most likely a
result of the increasing trend in educational attainment across cohorts.
Table 2 shows dierences in the average outcomes for children from the treatment
and control group who were born in 1967-1969, as well as those born in 1965. As is
evident from the table, children from the treatment group (who were born in Rogaland)
have somewhat lower educational attainment and IQ, as well as slightly higher drop out
rates, compared to children from the control group (who were born in the other counties).
We also see that these di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framework, this is suggestive of a small, if any, eect of family income on child outcomes
when using the oil boom as the instrument. This is because the reduced form of the
2SLS (without controls for child and family characteristics) would be equal to the mean
dierence in the outcome of interest between the treatment and control group for the
1967-1969 cohorts, subtracted from the same mean dierence for the 1965 cohort (i.e. a
dierence-in-dierences estimator).
Table 2 also displays the mean dierences in characteristics and family income for
children from the treatment and control group who were born in 1967-1969, as well as
those born in 1965. We immediately see that the treatment and control groups are quite
similar in terms of observable characteristics, and moreover, that these dierences change
little across cohorts. In contrast, average family income is substantially higher in the
treatment group compared to the control group, especially for the 1967-1969 cohorts,
which forms the basis for our rst stage regressions.
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of family income for the IV sample, compared to
a normal density function. We see a clustering of family incomes at the mean. To make
sure that the the observations with zero family income are not driving our ndings, the
robustness analysis reports results when excluding these families.
Turning attention to the FE sample, Figure 3 displays the average dierence in fam-
ily income between the younger and older sibling across the family income distribution.
The gure illustrates that there is little within-family income variation occurring in poor
families. This picture is mirrored in Table 3, reporting the mean, median, 10th and 90th
percentile in the distribution of income dierences between the younger and older siblings,
across the family income distribution. We see that the mean income dierence for the
total sample is positive and around NOK 27 600 (USD 4 760). When we partition the
sample into family income groups by NOK 75 000 (USD 12 900), we see that the median
income dierence increases steadily as we move upwards in the income distribution. It is
also evident that there is considerable variation in income dierences within each income
group.What Linear Estimators Miss 25
4 Empirical results
This section outlines our empirical models used in the OLS, IV and FE estimation, before
discussing our empirical results.
4.1 Empirical models
The main empirical model used in the literature is specied as
Model 1: yi = 0 + Ci + X0
i + i,
where yi is some outcome, Ci is family income when the child was young, and Xi is a set
of controls. Throughout our paper, Xi includes xed eects for birth cohort and county
of birth, as well as dummy variables for child's birth order, number of siblings, gender,
parent's age and college attendance. All the control variables are measured in the year
the child is born, and therefore before our variable of interest Ci.
Motivated by theoretical predictions and OLS results suggesting an increasing concave
relationship between family income and child outcome, our point of departure is to allow
the marginal eects of additional income to vary across the family income distribution.
Specically, we specify each child outcome to be a quadratic function of family income,
yielding
Model 2: yi = 0 + 1Ci + 2C2
i + X0
i + i.
This quadratic specication is intended to achieve a reasonable tradeo between a exible
functional form in family income and precision in the IV and FE estimation. We have,
however, performed OLS estimation with higher order polynomials in family income. As
illustrated in Figure 1, adding a cubic family income term barely moves the marginal
eect estimates over the majority of the family income distribution. In the robustness
analysis, we also perform OLS, FE and IV estimation with child outcomes specied as
a linear function of log family income, because a few previous studies have used such a
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To perform 2SLS estimation of Models 1 and 2, we use the following rst stage speci-
cations, where Zi is a set of instruments and Xi is the same set of controls as above:


















i + i (First Stage II)
When performing IV estimation of Model 1, we rst use a single binary instrument, equal
to 1 if the child is born in Rogaland in the years 1967-1969, and 0 otherwise. We refer to
this instrument as the \Rogaland dummy variable." However, to identify the parameters
of both the linear and the squared family income terms in Model 2, we need more than
one instrument. To construct multiple instruments, we use two dierent strategies. Both
strategies exploit the fact that if the Rogaland dummy variable is a valid instrument,
then under an assumption that i is mean-independent of the included covariates Xi
(a necessary assumption for consistent IV estimation of Model 1), any function of the
Rogaland dummy variable and the Xi are valid instruments.
The rst IV strategy interacts the Rogaland dummy variable with some of the control
variables, and uses this set of instruments in the rst stage specications (First Stage
I and II) of Model 2. Our reason for not interacting the Rogaland dummy variable
with all the included control variables is that such a procedure would introduce a large
number of over-identifying restrictions, which could increase the small sample bias of the
IV estimator (see e.g. Staiger and Stock, 1997). As a tradeo between small sample bias
and eciency in the IV estimation, our main specication interacts the Rogaland dummy
variable with ve control variables: indicator for father attended college, indicator for
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(3 or more siblings). The reason for choosing these control variables is that they generate
the strongest rst stage results. Importantly, to provide a direct comparison between the
IV results of Models 1 and 2, we will report 2SLS results from both models using the same
set of interaction instruments. As a robustness check, we also report IV results using only
a subset of these interactions, as well as the IV results from interacting the Rogaland
dummy variable with every included covariate.
The second IV strategy uses predicted family income and predicted family income
squared as the instruments. This strategy follows closely the IV literature where the
predicted treatment is used as the instrument in a conventional 2SLS procedure.18 The
predicted family income instruments are constructed by regressing family income on the
controls, the Rogaland dummy variable, and the ve interactions discussed above. From
these regression coecients, we predict family income for each child. Finally, we apply
the standard 2SLS procedure using predicted family income and predicted family income
squared as instruments, controlling for the Xi variables. To provide a direct comparison
between the IV results of Models 1 and 2, we also report 2SLS results from both models
using the same set of predicted family income instruments.
4.2 Linear OLS, IV and FE results
Columns 1-3 of Table 4 report the linear OLS, IV and FE estimates for our three outcome
measures: years of education, high school drop out, and IQ. The strong rst stage results
are reported in Table 8. From Panel I of Table 4, we see that our precise OLS result
indicate a positive and sizable eect of family income on children's educational attainment
and IQ as adults. To get a perspective on the magnitude of the parameter estimates, a
standard deviation increase in family income (NOK 101,000 or USD 17,414) is estimated
to produce slightly less than 0.5 additional years of education, a fall in high school drop
out rates in the range of 5 to 6 percent, and a rise in the IQ test score of more than 0.125
of a standard deviation. Comparing the results in Panel I and III, we see that the linear
18Wooldridge (2000), Carneiro et al. (2003) and Mogstad and Wiswall (2009) provide examples of
analysis using the predicted treatment as the instrument. In these applications, they nd a substantial
improvement in the precision of the IV estimates using the predicted treatment instruments over the IV
estimates using the instruments directly.What Linear Estimators Miss 28
OLS estimates are similar in the IV and FE sample.19
In Panels II and IV of Table 4, we report linear IV and FE results. The FE estimates
of family income on children's IQ and educational attainment are close to zero, and
signicantly dierent from the linear OLS estimates. In the spirit of previous studies,
these results would be interpreted as suggesting little, if any, causal eect of family income
on children's outcomes, as well as signicant omitted variables bias in the OLS estimates.
The IV estimates also show no sign of signicant eects of family income on child outcome,
although they are too imprecisely estimated to rule out some eect.
4.3 OLS, IV and FE weights
As discussed in Section 2, the interpretation and comparison of the linear estimates re-
ported in Table 4 rests on the relationship between family income and child outcomes
being linear or that the weights attached to the marginal eects are similar across the
linear estimators. To directly examine the weighting implicit in the linear estimators,
Table 5 and Figure 4 use the decomposition results in (3), (4), and (9) to compute the
weight functions over the marginal eects for the linear OLS, IV, and FE estimates. In
order to compute the weights, we have discretized the income distribution using family
income margins of NOK 25 000 (USD 4310).
From Table 5 and Figure 4, we see that the linear IV estimate assigns relatively
little weight to the marginal eects at the lower part of the family income distribution,
illustrating the the oil boom did not do that much for the family income of poor families.
It is also evident that well-o families in Norway experience most within-family income
variation, implying that marginal eects in the middle and upper part of the family income
distribution contribute the most to the linear FE estimate. In comparison, the linear OLS
estimator weights the dierent margins more evenly than the linear IV and FE estimates.
In particular, the OLS estimator assigns several times more weight to marginal eects in
the lower part of the family income distribution than the linear IV and FE estimator.
19When considering the IQ results, Table 4 displays a larger reduction in sample size in the FE es-
timation compared to the IV estimation. This is because we only have information on the IQ of men,
implying that the FE estimates are identied from within-family income variation among brothers.What Linear Estimators Miss 29
This evidence of substantially dierent weighting of the marginal eects of family
income underscores that we need to be cautious when interpreting and comparing the
results from these linear estimators. Moreover, it serves to illustrate how dierent studies
may have reached conicting conclusions about the eect of family size on child outcome,
because their linear estimates capture marginal eects at dierent parts of the family
income distribution.
4.4 Quadratic OLS, IV and FE results
Table 7 reports OLS, IV and FE results from Model 2 in which we have relaxed the
linearity restriction in Model 1 by including a squared term in family income. The strong
rst stage results are reported in Table 8. Panel II of Table 7 reports IV results using
the interacted instruments, and Panel III shows the IV results applying the predicted
family income instruments. Our main nding is that all of the results suggest a concave
relationship between family income and children's outcomes, with large marginal eects
at the lower parts of the family income distribution. This holds true for both the OLS
and FE results, as well as in the IV estimates, regardless of the choice of instruments.
Furthermore, we see a fairly precisely estimated concave pattern for all the outcomes.
To get a perspective on the magnitude of the estimated parameters, the FE estimates
suggest that a standard deviation increase in income (NOK 101 000, USD 17 414) produces
.22 additional years of education for a child from a family with income of NOK 150 000,
whereas a child from a family with income of NOK 300 000 only achieves an extra .02
years of education. In comparison, the linear IV estimates using the predicted family
income instruments indicates that such an increase in family income would generate .74
additional years of education for a child from the poor family, whereas the child from the
richer family would gain as little as .05 years of education.
As is evident from Table 7, the estimated family income eects dier, in some cases
signicantly, depending on the identication strategy used, even though they all suggest a
concave relationship. In particular, our IV estimates exceed the FE (and OLS) estimates,
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One is that our income collected from administrative registers is also noisily measured,
so that the FE estimates suer from more attenuation bias than the IV estimates. It
is also possible that the eect of family income is greater for the complier group to our
instruments, than for other children. Nor can we rule out that endogenous income shocks
are biasing the FE estimates. A nal possible explanation is that transitory shocks to
family income creating within-family income variation may, at least partly, be smoothed
out by inter-temporal income transfers, lowering the estimated eect of family income in
the FE estimation.
From Table 7, we also see that the IV estimates dier somewhat, though not signi-
cantly, depending on whether we use the interacted instruments or the predicted family
income instruments. This is most likely because dierent instruments will in general
identify dierent local average treatment eects (see Angrist and Imbens, 1994). Table
9 therefore reports IV results from Model 1, using the same instruments as used in the
IV estimates of Model 2, reported the in Table 7. Comparing the results from the linear
and quadratic specication using the same set of instruments, it is clear the role of the
linearity restriction in masking the family income eects. The linear IV estimates are
never signicantly dierent, and always insignicantly dierent from zero, whereas the
quadratic IV estimates using the same set of instruments show large and signicant ef-
fects of family income. Hence, we can conclude for a given set of instruments, the second
stage restriction plays an important role in the conclusion of the eects of family income
on child outcome. Comparing the linear and quadratic specication using the same set
of instruments, we also see that relaxing the linearity restriction may yield a substantial
improvement in the precision, illustrating that using linear estimators may not even be
preferable on grounds of eciency.
4.5 Robustness analysis
This subsection discusses a number of robustness checks, supporting the validity of our
main results.
Functional form. Our quadratic specication is intended to achieve a reasonable trade-What Linear Estimators Miss 31
o between exibility in functional form and achieving sucient precision. We have, how-
ever, also performed the FE and IV estimation with a cubic term in family income. The
coecients associated with the cubic term are insignicant, indicating that the concave
specication might be reasonable. However, we admittedly cannot rule out that an even
more exible specication would provide a better approximation of the causal relationship
between family income and child outcome. At the very least, our quadratic model nests
the linear model, and is therefore an improvement over the linear specication in family
income used in previous studies.
We have also performed OLS estimation with higher order polynomials in family in-
come. As illustrated in Figure 1, adding a cubic family income term has little impact on
the marginal eect estimates across the majority of the family income distribution. In
addition, we have performed OLS estimation discretizing the family income variable into
27 dummy variables capturing the \marginal eects" of increasing family income by NOK
25 000. As shown in Table 6, the estimates from this non-parametric approximation of
family income suggests a concave relationship between family income and child outcomes
that line up well with the quadratic (and cubic) OLS results, although they are quite
imprecise at the uppermost part of the family income distribution where there are few
observations. This indicates that the concave specication in family income, as suggested
by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), might not be too crude of an approximation of the
causal relationship between family income and child outcomeS.
Small sample bias. In general, the consistency and asymptotic distribution of the
IV estimator is unaected by whether we use the Rogaland dummy variable as the only
instrument, or construct several instruments by interacting the Rogaland dummy variable
with some control variables (see e.g. the discussion in Newey, 1990, 1993). The same holds
true for whether we use the set of interacted instruments directly or the predicted family
income instruments in the rst stage regressions. In particular, the asymptotic variance
of the IV estimator is unaected by the initial estimation of the predicted family income
instruments. However, the small sample properties of the IV estimator may be aected
by whether we use the Rogaland dummy variable as the only instrument, or use multipleWhat Linear Estimators Miss 32
instruments by interacting the Rogaland dummy variable with some control variables.
Given our large samples and strong rst stage results reported in Table 8, small sample
bias in the IV estimator because of multiple instruments should be of little concern (see
e.g. Staiger and Stock, 1997). It is nevertheless re-assuring to nd in Table 10 that
the quadratic IV results when using only two interaction instruments yields very similar
results as those reported in Table 7. Moreover, we see that the quadratic IV estimates
change little when interacting the Rogaland dummy variable with each included control
variable.
Omitted variables bias. If we could nd a variable that is strongly correlated with
our outcomes of interest, but unlikely to be aected signicantly by family income, then
we may use it to perform a placebo test to informally assess the omitted variables bias
in our estimates. In this paper, we exploit variation in adult height to perform placebo
tests. Height should be a promising candidate in developed countries for two reasons.
First, a large number of twin and adoptive studies have shown that genetic factors are
the overwhelming determinant of variation in height within developed countries, in which
childhood diet is likely to be of minor importance for adult height. For example, Silven-
toinen et al. (2003) report heritability estimates around 0.9 for Norwegian males born
between 1967 and 1978, implying that within this population about 90% of the variance
in adult height can be accounted for by the variance of genes.
Second, it has long been recognized that taller adults have, on average, higher edu-
cation and earnings. This also holds true in our sample where the correlation between
height and our outcomes of interest are always highly signicant: For example, a one
standard deviation increase in height (6.5 cm) is associated with an increase in education
by .26 years and IQ scores by .25, while lowering dropout rates by 3 percentage points.
Case and Paxson (2008) oer an explanation: On average, taller people complete more
education and perform better on IQ tests. As early as age 3, and throughout childhood,
they nd that taller children perform signicantly better on cognitive tests. Moreover,
they demonstrate that the correlation between height in childhood and adulthood is very
high, so that tall children are much more likely to become tall adults.What Linear Estimators Miss 33
A signicant eect of family income on children's adult height would raise concerns
that eects on other outcomes reect omitted variables bias, like unobserved heterogeneity
in innate ability, rather than true policy impacts. Table 11 reveals that our OLS estimates
show quite small but signicant positive eects of family income on adult height, whereas
the IV and FE estimates suggest no eect of family income on adult height. This holds
true both for the linear and quadratic specication of family income. Since the placebo
tests are performed only for males due to data availability, it should be noted that the IQ
results are also based on the subsample of males.20
Log specication. Above, we have followed Dahl and Lochner (2008) and others in
measuring family income in levels rather than logs. However, some previous studies have
preferred to specify family income as a linear function of log income, perhaps to allow for
the eect of income to be stronger in poor families. For comparison and as a robustness
of our results, Table 12 shows results when replacing family income in levels with logs
(row c) in Model 1 (excluding families with zero family income). It is reassuring to nd,
like in Dahl and Lochner (2008), that measuring family in logs rather than levels does
not change our main results. Specically, the linear OLS estimates indicate a positive
and sizable eect of family income on children's outcome. For example, a 10 % increase
in family income corresponds to an additional .1 years of education. Moreover, the linear
FE estimates of family income close to zero, and are signicantly dierent from the linear
OLS estimates. We also see that the linear IV estimates show no sign of signicant eects
of family income on child outcome, although they are too imprecisely estimated to rule
out some eect. We conclude therefore that neither the linear specication in log family
income nor the linear specication in level family income is able to uncover the positive,
concave relationship between family income and child outcomes.
Zero income families. As a nal robustness check, we make sure that our results are
not driven by the small number of observations with zero family income. From the linear
estimates in Table 12 we see that results excluding families with zero family income (row
20Table 11 displays a larger reduction in sample size in the FE estimation compared to the IV estima-
tion. This is because we only have information on the height of men, implying that the FE estimates are
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b) give very similar results to the baseline estimates (row a), reported in Table 4. We do
the same comparison for the quadratic estimates in Table 13. Also in this case, we nd
that the results without observations with zero income (row b) are very similar to the
baseline estimates (row a), reported in Table 7.21
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use a rich Norwegian data set to re-examine the causal relationship be-
tween childhood family income and child outcomes. Motivated by theoretical predictions
and OLS results suggesting a nonlinear relationship, we depart from previous studies in
allowing the marginal eects on children's outcomes of an increase in family income to
vary across the family income distribution. The insights from our empirical analysis may
be summarized in the following two conclusions.
First, linear FE and IV estimators, as used in previous studies, provide a misleading
picture of the causal relationship between family size and child outcome. Specically, our
linear FE and IV results show estimates of family income on children's IQ and educational
attainment that are insignicant and typically close to zero, whereas the linear OLS
estimates suggest signicant and sizable eects of family income. In the spirit of previous
studies, our results could be interpreted as suggesting little, if any, causal eect of family
income on children's outcomes, once omitted variables bias is addressed by IV or FE
techniques. However, when relaxing the linearity restriction in family income, the IV
and FE estimates line up with the OLS results in suggesting a concave relationship, with
marginal eects at the lower part of the family income distribution that are several orders
of magnitude larger than the marginal eects at the middle and upper part of the family
income distribution.
Second, from the weight functions of the marginal eects behind the linear FE and IV
estimators, we learn that our linear estimates suggest little, if any, impact of family income
because they mostly capture the small marginal eects in the middle and upper part of
21The same holds true when dropping observations with family income above 500 000 NOK, and when
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the family income distribution. In comparison, the linear OLS estimator assign much
more weight to the lower parts of the family income distribution, with higher marginal
eects. This evidence of quite dierent weighting of the marginal eects of family income
underscores that we need to be cautious when interpreting and comparing the results
from these linear estimators. Moreover, it serves to illustrate how dierent studies may
have reached conicting conclusions about the eect of family income on child outcomeS
because their linear estimates capture the marginal eects at dierent parts of the family
income distribution.
A general lesson to be drawn from our study is that the linearity restriction in IV
and FE estimation may drive the conclusions reached in applications where there are
reasons to suspect a nonlinear relationship, as in research on the return to education,
the eect of family size on child outcome, and the impact of maternal smoking on child
birthweight. This nding stands in stark contrast to the view advocated by Angrist
and Pischke (2010), who claim that \The linear models that constitute the workhorse of
contemporary empirical practice usually turn out to be remarkably robust" (p. 10). Our
study echo the argument of Leamer (1983) that functional form concerns are inescapable
in empirical research. In fact, IV and FE estimation may exacerbate the sensitivity of the
results to functional form assumptions, because of the way they weight the underlying
marginal eects. The ideal remedy is sensitivity analysis, showing how the results vary
with changes in functional form. And further, one should compute the weights functions,
to know what the linear estimates actually identify and interpret the results in view of
that.
Our results may also be of interest from a policy perspective. Most developed coun-
tries have a range of policies targeted at family income during childhood, such as family
allowances, maternity benets, single parent benets, and family tax credits. In fact,
families with children receive special treatment under the tax-benet system in twenty-
eight of the thirty OECD-countries (OECD, 2002).22 While some of these policies are
means-tested, others are more universal of nature. Our IV and FE results suggest a con-
22See Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2010) for an analysis of the dierential eects of these types of
policies within an estimated household model of child development.What Linear Estimators Miss 36
cave relationship between family income and child outcomeS with relatively large positive
eect at the lower part of the family income distribution, indicates that policies targeting
poor families may be quite eective in promoting child development.What Linear Estimators Miss 37
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6 Figures
Figure 1: OLS estimates of marginal eects on years of education
 
Notes: This gure uses the IV sample to graph OLS estimates of marginal eects from a linear specication
in family income (Model 1), a quadratic specication in family income (Model 2), and cubic specication
in family income (adding a cubic term in family income to Model 2).What Linear Estimators Miss 41
Figure 2: Density of the family income distribution
 
Note: This gure uses the IV sample.
Figure 3: Dierence in family income between younger and older sibling across the family
income distribution
 
Note: This gure uses the FE sample.What Linear Estimators Miss 42
Figure 4: Linear OLS, IV and FE weights
 
Notes: This table reports the weights for the linear OLS and IV estimates (using the IV sample), shown
in Panels I and II, and the linear FE estimate (using the FE sample), shown in Panel IV of Table 4. To
compute these weights, we use the decomposition in (3), (4), (9), and income margins of NOK 25 000.What Linear Estimators Miss 43
7 Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for IV and FE sample
IV sample FE sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Female .49 .50 .49 .50
Number of siblings 2.13 1.29 1.98 1.11
Birth order 2.20 1.28 1.91 1.00
Mother college .07 .26 .09 .28
Father college .16 .37 .17 .38
Mother's age when child is born 26.7 5.98 25.2 4.77
Father's age when child is born 29.9 7.90 28.3 5.81
Education in 2006 12.39 2.50 12.60 2.50
Dropout rate from high school .30 .46 .26 .44
IQ (boys only) 5.01 1.82 5.11 1.80
Family income (child aged 2-12)
in 10000 NOK 25.2 10.1 27.5 10.1
Height (males only) 179.7 6.5 179.8 6.6
N 121122 202424
Notes: The IV sample consists of children born in 1965 and 1967-1979 in the following counties: Roga-
land, Sr-Trndelag, Hedmark, Vestfold, Aust-Agder, Oppland, Telemark, Sogn og Fjordande, Mre og
Romsdal, Nord-Trndelag, and Buskerud. The FE sample consists of children born in 1965 and 1967-1977
from the same counties.What Linear Estimators Miss 44
Table 2: Mean dierences between children from the treatment and control group, by
birth cohort
-Levels- -Dierence (SE)- -Dierence (SE)-
Treatment Treatment-Control Treatment-control
1967-1969 1967-1969 1965
Female .49 -.001 (.005) -.003 (.008)
Number of siblings 2.08 .23 (.011) .19 (.021)
Birth order 2.18 .11 (.011) .05 (.021)
Mother college .07 -.008 (.002) -.013 (.004)
Father college .16 -.006 (.003) .003 (.006)
Mother's age
when child is born 26.5 .22 (.053) .09 (.101)
Father's age
when child is born 29.5 -.14 (.069) -.36 (.138)
Education in 2006 12.27 -.201 (.023) -.209 (.040)
Dropout rate from high school .29 .004 (.004) .012 (.008)
IQ (males only) 5.06 .017 (.024) .049 (.043)
Family income
(child aged 2-12)
in 10000 NOK 26.3 2.65 (.090) 1.87 (.157)
Height (males only) 179.3 -.58 (.083) -.51 (.144)
N 14759 91164 29958
Notes: The treatment group consists of children born in Rogaland. The control group consists of children
born in in Sr-Trndelag, Hedmark, Vestfold, Aust-Agder, Oppland, Telemark, Sogn og Fjordande, Mre
og Romsdal, Nord-Trndelag, and Buskerud.What Linear Estimators Miss 45
Table 3: Distribution of Sibling Dierence in Family Income
mean median 10th 90th
Total sample 2.76 2.16 -1.40 7.85
Family income
rst sibling
0-75000 1.70 0.30 -1.70 5.46
75000-150000 1.16 0.71 -2.93 5.56
150000-225000 1.81 1.35 -1.49 5.81
225000-300000 2.57 2.19 -1.06 6.71
300000-375000 3.33 3.07 -1.34 8.49
375000-450000 4.12 3.63 -1.42 10.63
450000-525000 4.81 4.12 -1.37 12.65
525000-600000 5.61 4.68 -1.61 14.58
600000-675000 8.10 6.54 -1.07 21.10
Notes: This table partitions the IV sample into family income (for rst sibling) groups by NOK 75 000.
For each group, we compute the mean, median, 10th and 90th percentile in the distribution of income
dierences between the younger and older siblings.What Linear Estimators Miss 46
Table 4: Linear OLS, IV and FE estimates
Education Dropout IQ
(males only)
Panel I: Linear OLS
Family income in 10000 NOK .043*** -.006*** .028***
(.001) (.000) (.001)
Panel II: Linear IV
Instrument:
Born in Rogaland in 67-69
Family income in 10000 NOK .022 -.012 -.061
(.057) (.011) (.072)
N 121122 121122 57788
Panel III: Linear OLS
Family income in 10000 NOK .041*** -.005*** .024***
(.001) (.000) (.001)
Panel IV: Linear FE
67-77 sibling pairs
Family income in 10000 NOK .000 -.001 -.001
(.003) (.001) (.004)
N 202424 202424 55866
Notes: This table reports OLS, IV and FE estimates of Model 1. Panels I and II use the IV sample,
whereas Panel III and IV use the FE sample. Panel II uses the born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy
variable as the only instrument. A full set of controls is used in all regressions. Standard errors in
parentheses are heteroskedastic robust. *** Signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant
at 10 % level.What Linear Estimators Miss 47
Table 5: Linear OLS, IV and FE weights
OLS weight IV weight FE weights
Income margins
1: income  25000 .017 .006 .006
2: income  50000 .024 .008 .009
3: income  75000 .029 .011 .012
4: income  100000 .035 .014 .014
5: income  125000 .041 .023 .016
6: income  150000 .050 .037 .020
7: income  175000 .062 .065 .026
8: income  200000 .076 .099 .034
9: income  225000 .088 .129 .049
10: income  250000 .093 .132 .066
11: income  275000 .090 .120 .080
12: income  300000 .081 .097 .088
13: income  325000 .070 .075 .088
14: income  350000 .059 .055 .083
15: income  375000 .048 .039 .075
16: income  400000 .038 .028 .065
17: income  425000 .029 .021 .056
18: income  450000 .022 .016 .047
19: income  475000 .017 .010 .039
20: income  500000 .012 .007 .032
21: income  525000 .008 .004 .026
22: income  550000 .005 .003 .020
23: income  575000 .003 .001 .015
24: income  600000 .002 .001 .011
25: income  625000 .001 .000 .007
26: income  650000 .001 .000 .003
Notes: This table reports the weights for the linear OLS and IV estimates (using the IV sample), shown
in Panels I and II, and the linear FE estimate (using the FE sample), shown in Panel IV of Table 4. To
compute these weights, we use the decomposition in (3), (4), (9), and income margins of NOK 25 000What Linear Estimators Miss 48
Table 6: OLS estimates of marginal eects
Education Dropout IQ (males only)
Income margins
1: 0  income < 25000 .058 -.010 .031
2: 25000  income < 50000 .057 -.009 .031
3: 50000  income < 75000 .055 -.009 .031
4: 75000  income < 100000 .054 -.008 .030
5: 100000  income < 125000 .050 -.008 .030
6: 125000  income < 150000 .049 -.008 .030
7: 150000  income < 175000 .047 -.007 .029
8: 175000  income < 200000 .046 -.007 .029
9: 200000  income < 225000 .044 -.007 .028
10: 225000  income < 250000 .042 -.006 .028
11: 250000  income < 275000 .041 -.006 .028
12: 275000  income < 300000 .039 -.005 .027
13: 300000  income < 325000 .038 -.005 .027
14: 325000  income < 350000 .036 -.005 .027
15: 350000  income < 375000 .035 -.004 .026
16: 375000  income < 400000 .033 -.004 .026
17: 400000  income < 425000 .031 -.004 .025
18: 425000  income < 450000 .030 -.003 .025
19: 450000  income < 475000 .028 -.003 .025
20: 475000  income < 500000 .027 -.002 .024
21: 500000  income < 525000 .025 -.002 .024
22: 525000  income < 550000 .024 -.002 .023
23: 550000  income < 575000 .022 -.001 .023
24: 575000  income < 600000 .020 -.001 .023
25: 600000  income < 625000 .019 -.001 .022
26: 625000  income < 650000 .018 -.000 .022
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of marginal eects from Model 2, using predicted income and
income squared and the average value of income in each income group. This will then capture the
\marginal eects" of increasing family income by NOK 25 000. A full set of controls is used in each of
the regressions.What Linear Estimators Miss 49




Panel I: Quadratic OLS
Family income in 10000 NOK .051*** -.010*** .032***
(.002) (.000) (.002)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.016*** .008*** -.008*
(.005) (.001) (.004)
Panel II: Quadratic IV
Instruments: Interactions
Family income in 10000 NOK .180** -.030* .234**
(.087) (.016) (.109)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.302* .042* -.401**
(.164) (.021) (.210)
Panel III: Quadratic IV
Instruments: Predicted income
Family income in 10000 NOK .142** -.057*** .195***
(.072) (.013) (.070)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.228** .097*** -.323***
(.107) (.019) (.106)
N 121122 121122 57788
Panel IV: Quadratic OLS
Family income in 10000 NOK .069*** -.012*** .033***
(.002) (.000) (.003)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.050*** .013*** -.017***
(.003) (.001) (.004)
Panel V: Quadratic FE
Family income in 10000 NOK .041*** -.006*** .019*
(.008) (.002) (.010)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.065*** .008*** -.031**
(.013) (.002) (.014)
N 202424 202424 55866
Notes: This table reports OLS, IV and FE estimates of Model 2. Panels I, II and III use the IV sample,
whereas Panels IV and V use the FE sample. Panel II uses the set of interacted instruments (born
in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable and interacting the born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy
variable with father's college, mother's college, father's age, mother's age and large family) in First
Stages I and II, whereas Panel III uses the predicted family income instruments based on the same set
of interacted instruments in First Stages I and II. A full set of controls is used in all regressions. Note
that the quadratic income regressor is linear income (in 10,000 NOK) multiplied by 100, hence quadratic
income is in 1,000,000 NOK. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedastic robust. *** Signicant
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Panel I: Linear IV
Instrument: Born in Rogaland
in 1967-1969
Family income in 10000 NOK .022 -.012 .033
(.057) (.011) (.023)
Panel II: Linear IV
Instruments: Interactions
Family income in 10000 NOK .026 -.008 -.017
(.020) (.006) (.013)
Panel III: Linear IV
Instruments: Predicted income
Family income in 10000 NOK -.010 .001 -.018
(.012) (.001) (.013)
N 121122 121122 57788
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of Model 1 using the IV sample. Panel I uses the born in
Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable instrument. Panel II uses the set of interacted instruments (born
in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable and interacting the born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy
variable with father's college, mother's college, father's age, mother's age and large family), whereas
Panel III uses the predicted family income instruments based on the same set of interacted instruments.
A full set of controls is used in all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastic robust.
*** Signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant at 10 % level.What Linear Estimators Miss 52




Panel I: Quadratic IV
Instruments: All interactions
Family income in 10000 NOK .178** -.046*** .171**
(.075) (.014) (.079)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.260* .067** -.246*
(.139) (.022) (.149)
Panel II: Quadratic IV
Instruments: Predicted income
Family income in 10000 NOK .199*** -.070*** .241***
(.071) (.013) (.070)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.301*** .113*** -.382***
(.106) (.019) (.107)
Panel III: Quadratic IV
Instruments: Interactions
Family income in 10000 NOK .207** -.036* .256**
(.100) (.019) (.114)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.316* .045 -.432*
(.180) (.035) (.222)
Panel IV: Quadratic IV
Instruments: Predicted income
Family income in 10000 NOK .192** -.072*** .212***
(.088) (.015) (.071)
Quadratic income (x 100) -.288** .114*** -.342***
(.124) (.022) (.105)
N 121122 121122 57788
Notes: This table reports IV estimates of Model 2. Panel I uses a full set of interacted instruments
in First stages I and II (born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable and interacting the born in
Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable with all included covariates). Panel II uses the predicted family
income instruments based on this full set of interacted instruments in First Stages I and II. Panel III
uses a subset of interacted instruments (born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable and interacting
the born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable with only mothers college and large family) in First
Stages I and II. Panel IV uses this the predicted family income instruments based on this subset of
interacted instruments in First Stages I and II. A full set of controls is used in all regressions. Note
that the quadratic income regressor is linear income (in 10,000 NOK) multiplied by 100, hence quadratic
income is in 1,000,000 NOK. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedastic robust. *** Signicant
at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant at 10 % level.What Linear Estimators Miss 53
Table 11: Height (males only) - robustness tests I
Linear Quadratic
Family income Family income
in 10000 NOK (x 100)
Panel I: OLS
.034*** (.003)
.047*** (.009) -.027* (.016)
Panel II: IV
Instrument: Born in Rogaland in 67-69 -.125 (.213)
Instruments: Interactions .061 (.409) -.163 (.797)




.058*** (.009) -.046*** (.015)
Panel IV: FE
-.007 (.013)
.009 (.035) -.025 (.049)
N 61322 61322
Notes: This table reports OLS, IV and FE estimates of Model 1 and 2. Panels I and II uses the IV
sample, whereas Panel III and IV uses the FE sample. Panel II uses rst born in Rogaland in 1967-1969
dummy variable as the only instrument, before using the set of interacted instruments (born in Rogaland
in 1967-1969 dummy variable and interacting the born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable with
father's college, mother's college, father's age, mother's age and large family) in First Stages I and II, and
nally the predicted family income instruments based on the same set of interacted instruments in First
Stages I and II. A full set of controls is used in all regressions. Note that the quadratic income regressor is
linear income (in 10,000 NOK) multiplied by 100, hence quadratic income is in 1,000,000 NOK. Standard
errors in parentheses are heteroskedastic robust. *** Signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level,
* signicant at 10 % level.What Linear Estimators Miss 54
Table 12: Linear OLS, IV and FE estimates - robustness tests II
Education Dropout IQ
(males only)
Panel I: Linear OLS
a) baseline .043*** (.001) -.006*** (.001) .028*** (.001)
b) drop 0 income .043*** (.001) -.006*** (.000) .029*** (.001)
c) ln(income) .010*** (.000) -.001*** (.000) .006*** (.000)
Panel II: Linear IV
a) baseline .022 (.056) -.012 (.011) -.061 (.072)
b) drop 0 income .018 (.061) -.013 (.012) -.062 (.073)
c) ln(income) .007 (.027) -.006 (.006) -.024 (.027)
Panel III: Linear OLS
a) baseline .041*** (.001) -.005*** (.000) .024*** (.001)
b) drop 0 income .041*** (.001) -.005*** (.000) .023*** (.001)
c) ln(income) .010*** (.000) -.001*** (.000) .006*** (.000)
Panel IV: Linear FE
a) baseline .000 (.003) -.001 (.001) -.001 (.004)
b) drop 0 income .000 (.004) -.001 (.001) -.001 (.004)
c) ln(income) .001 (.001) -.000 (.000) .001 (.001)
Notes: This table reports OLS, IV and FE estimates of Model 1. Panels I and II uses the IV sample,
whereas Panel III and IV uses the FE sample. Panel II uses rst born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy
variable as the only instrument, A full set of controls is used in all regressions. Standard errors in
parentheses are heteroskedastic robust. *** Signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant
at 10 % level.What Linear Estimators Miss 55
Table 13: Quadratic OLS, IV and FE - robustness tests III
Education Dropout IQ
(males only)
Panel I: Quadratic OLS
a)baseline .051*** (.002) -.010*** (.000) .032*** (.002)
-.016*** (.005) .008*** (.001) -.008* (.004)
b) drop 0 income .052*** (.002) -.010*** (.001) .033*** (.003)
-.018*** (.002) .008*** (.001) -.010*** (.005)
Panel II: Quadratic IV
Instruments: Interactions
a) baseline .180** (.087) -.030* (.016) .234** (.109)
-.302* (.164) .042* (.021) -.401** (.210)
b) drop 0 income .174** (.085) -.028* (.015) .211* (.109)
-.293* (.160) .039 (.030) -.363* (.213)
Panel III: Quadratic IV
Instruments: Predicted income
a)baseline .142** (.072) -.057*** (.013) .195*** (.070)
-.228** (.107) .097*** (.019) -.323*** (.106)
b) drop 0 income .144** (.068) -.054*** (.011) .168*** (.063)
-.235** (.097) .091*** (.016) -.283*** (.090)
Panel IV: Quadratic OLS
a) baseline .069*** (.002) -.012*** (.000) .033*** (.003)
-.050*** (.003) .013*** (.001) -.017*** (.004)
b) drop 0 income .069*** (.002) -.013*** (.000) .033*** (.003)
-.050*** (.003) .013*** (.001) -.017*** (.004)
Panel V: Quadratic FE
a) baseline .041*** (.008) -.006*** (.002) .019* (.010)
-.065*** (.013) .008*** (.002) -.031* (.014)
b) drop 0 income .042*** (.008) -.006*** (.002) .013 (.012)
-.065*** (.013) .008*** (.002) -.018 (.016)
Notes: This table reports OLS, IV and FE estimates of Model 2. Panels I and II uses the IV sample,
whereas Panel III and IV uses the FE sample. The top row in each specication is the linear coecient
on family income (in 10000 NOK), and the bottom row is the quadratic coecient (x 1,000). Panel II
uses the set of interacted instruments (born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable and interacting
the born in Rogaland in 1967-1969 dummy variable with father's college, mother's college, father's age,
mother's age and large family) in First Stages I and II, whereas Panel III uses the predicted family income
instruments based on the same set of interacted instruments in First Stages I and II. A full set of controls
is used in all regressions. Note that the quadratic income is linear income (in 10,000 NOK) multiplied
by 100, hence quadratic income is in 1,000,000 NOK. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedastic
robust. *** Signicant at 1 % level, ** signicant at 5 % level, * signicant at 10 % level.What Linear Estimators Miss 56
APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof consists of two steps. The rst step proves that (FE) =
P c
c=1 wc(FE)s,
whereas the second steps proves that
P c
c=1 wc(FE) = 1.
Step 1: Since Cbj, and thereby Cj, takes on values in the nite set f0;1;:::; cg, there
are
P c+1
k=1 k possible combinations of childhood family income between siblings. Under
Assumption A3, these combinations generate the following expected dierences in siblings'
outcomes:
C1j = 0;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 0] = 2
C1j = 0;Cj = 1 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 1] = 2 + 1
. . .
C1j = 0;Cj =  c : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj =  c] = 2 +
P c
c=1 c
C1j = 1;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 1;Cj = 0] = 2
C1j = 1;Cj = 1 : E[yjjC1j = 1;Cj = 1] = 2 + 2
. . .





C1j =  c   1;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j =  c   1;Cj = 0] = 2
C1j =  c   1;Cj = 1 : E[yjjC1j =  c   1;Cj = 1] = 2 +  c
C1j =  c;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j =  c;Cj = 0] = 2





Let pc(s) denote pr(C1j = cjCj = s), and note that
P c
c=0 pc(0) = 1,
P c 1
c=0 pc(1) = 1,
:::, p0( c) = 1. By iterating expectations over family income levels C1j in s, we get:




where h11 = p0(1);h12 = p1(1);:::;h1 c = p c 1(1).
2 = [p0(2)(1 + 2) + p1(2)(2 + 3) +  + p c 2(2)( c 1 +  c)]
 [p0(1)1 + p1(1)2 +  + p c 1(1) c] =
 c X
c=1
h2cc;What Linear Estimators Miss 57





c   [(p0( c   1)
 c 1 X
c=1







where h c;1 = 1   p0( c   1);h c;2 = 1   p0( c   1)   p1( c   1), :::, h c; c = 1   p1( c   1).
These expressions show that each s is a weighted function of the 1;:::; c marginal




































s=1  s = 1 and
P c
c=1 hsc = 1 for all s = 1;:::; c.
To see that
P c



















h cc =  c   ( c   1)(p0( c   1) + p1( c   1)) = 1;
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, a simple example with four values of income is sucient. Suppose
that Cbj, and thereby Cj, takes the values 0, 1, 2, or 3. There are 10 possible combina-
tions of childhood family income between siblings, which under Assumption A3 generate
the following expected dierences in siblings' outcomes:
C1j = 0;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 0] = 2
C1j = 0;Cj = 1 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 1] = 2 + 1
C1j = 0;Cj = 2 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 2] = 2 + 1 + 2
C1j = 0;Cj = 3 : E[yjjC1j = 0;Cj = 3] = 2 + 1 + 2 + 3
C1j = 1;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 1;Cj = 0] = 2
C1j = 1;Cj = 1 : E[yjjC1j = 1;Cj = 1] = 2 + 2
C1j = 1;Cj = 2 : E[yjjC1j = 1;Cj = 2] = 2 + 2 + 3
C1j = 2;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 2;Cj = 0] = 2
C1j = 2;Cj = 1 : E[yjjC1j = 2;Cj = 1] = 2 + 3
C1j = 3;Cj = 0 : E[yjjC1j = 3;Cj = 0] = 2





Let pc(s) denote pr(C1j = cjCj = s), and note that p0(1) + p1(1) + p2(1) = 1 and
p0(2) + p1(2) = 1. By iterating expectations over family income levels C1j in s, we get
3 = [1 + 2 + 3]   [p0(2)(1 + 2) + p1(2)(2 + 3)] = (1   p0(2))1 + (1   p1(2))3;
2 = [p0(2)(1 + 2) + p1(2)(2 + 3)]   [p0(1)1 + p1(1)2 + p2(1))3]
= (p0(2)   p0(1))1 + (1   p1(1))2 + (p1(2)   p2(1))3;
and
1 = p0(1)1 + p1(1)2 + p2(1)3;






w1(FE) =  3 + p0(2)( 2    3) + p0(1)( 1    2);
w2(FE) =  2 + p1(1)( 1    2);
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w3(FE) =  3 + p1(2)( 2    3) + p2(1)( 1    2):
Since w1(FE) + w2(FE) + w3(FE) = 1, we know that at least some of these FE
weights must be positive. However, there is nothing that ensures that all wc(FE) are
non-negative, even though  c and pc(s) are non-negative for all c and s. Specically, if  2
is suciently large compared to  3, then w3(FE) or w1(FE) can be negative, depending
on the values of the conditional probabilities pc(s).
For example, consider the case where p0(2) = 0 (implying that p1(2) = 1) and p0(1) =
1 (implying that p1(1) = 0 and p2(1) = 0). In this case, w1(FE) =  1 +  3    2,
w2(FE) =  2, and w3(FE) =  2. If the population share experiencing Cj = 2 is
suciently large, then w1(FE) will be negative. To see this, suppose that the within-
family income variation is such that pr(Cj = 0) = :05, and pr(Cj = 1) = :4. Then,
w1(FE) will be negative whenever pr(Cj = 3) < :23 (implying that pr(Cj = 2) > :32).
Along the same lines, it is straightforward to show that some (but not all) wc(FE)
also can be negative when  c > 3.
QED
A.3 Computation of FE Decomposition
In order to compute the linear FE weights dened in Theorem 1, we use an iterative
algorithm. Note that we can re-write FE decomposition as:
(FE) = ~  1E[yjjCj = 0] + ~  2E[yjjCj = 1]
+ + ~   c 1E[yjjCj =  c   1] + ~   cE[yjjCj =  c]
where ~  1 =   1, ~  s =  s 1    s for s = 1;2;:::; c   1, and ~   c =   c.
Our iterative algorithm is as follows:
Step 1: Set wc(FE) = 0 for all c = 0;1;:::; c.
Step 2: Loop over all possible income changes 0;1;:::; c.
Step 3: For each income change s, loop over all rst sibling income levels indexed c =
0;1;:::; c. We re-set wc(FE) as
wc(FE) = wc(FE) + ~  cpc(s):
Note that for infeasible combinations of changes in income s and levels of rst sibling
income c, pc(s) = 0. Replacing  s and pc(s) with their sample analog estimators, allows
us to estimate wc(FE) for all c.